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Abstract
In this essay Katherine Franke examines two
contemporary cites in which state eff orts to eradicate
the traces of empire and to resurrect an authentic postcolonial nation have produced sexual subjects that
serve as a kind of existential residue and reminder of
a demonized colonial past and absence. Looking first
at post-colonial Zimbabwe, Franke argues that
President Mugabe’s aggressively homophobic policies
have played a key role in fortifying his leadership as
authentically African and post-colonial.
Franke then turns to current efforts by the
Mubarak government in Egypt to publically prosecute
men for having sex with men.
The Mubarak
government has used homosexual show trials, first in
security courts, and then in civilian courts, as a dry
run for the reorganization of the Egyptian court
system’s jurisdiction over dissenters and outcasts.
When a people seek to put behind them an ignoble past
characterized by domination, exploitation or tyranny of the many by the few,
they can be dogged, if not haunted by the residue of that past. This residue
can take many forms, and can threaten the coherence, stability and
forward-looking nature of the new states that are brought into being during
these periods of revolt and re-building. Residue can also prove to be a quite
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productive prop to the masters of post-colonial statecraft. In this essay, I
explore two circumstances in which the aggressive efforts of a state to
unwrite its colonial past have left smudges of erasure -- not just any
smudges, but sexual smudges. In these two contexts, state efforts to
eradicate the traces of empire and to resurrect an authentic post-colonial
nation have produced sexual subjects that serve as a kind of existential
residue and reminder of a demonized colonial past and absence. They are
useful residue, indeed.
We all know by now that sex is an especially dense transfer point
for power. (Foucault 1990) By this Foucault meant that sex is particularly
well suited to the projects of control, denigration, regulation or governance.
It is an especially good lever by which to wield power of various sorts. But
it also may be the case that in circumstances in which power is being
transferred - from colonial to post-colonial control, for instance - sex is not
far from the scene. That is, in dense transfer points of power, sex is likely
to make an appearance. Foucault taught us that where there is sex, there
is likely power. But I hope to show here that where there is power, there
is likely to be sex.
Contemporary Zimbabwe and Egypt show us that at moments
where state power is being solidified in new forms, the state gains an
official sexuality, some sources of threat are singled out and sexualized, and
the management of sex becomes a tool of governance that produces
individual unfreedom in the name of expanding national freedom or
independence. What we see in these two contexts are government efforts
to deliberately erase their colonial pasts in order to call forth a more
authentic indigenous present. Of course, this sort of erasure is impossible,
in the sense that these regimes cannot rewind the tape to a pre-colonial era
and then hit the play button anew. Nor can they either rhetorically or
politically forge a rebirth of the authentic nation purged of any trace of
colonial involvement or investment. These governments nevertheless
persist in post-colonial or extra-colonial governance aimed at indigenization.
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Their efforts can be understood as at once destructive and productive -- the
projects to destroy the past leave a remainder, and excess -- a set of sexual
perverts/abjects, whose sexual subjectivity is in large part the product of the
government’s use of sex as a tool of statecraft.
First, I look at the sexual politics of rule of President Robert
Mugabe in Zimbabwe. Mugabe has found the deployment of sex as a
particularly useful wedge issue in his mission of national freedom - that is,
freedom from colonial rule by the British. Mugabe has effectively
undertaken brutally homophobic polic ies by framing them within a postcolonial story that has enormous purchase with his people, and, indeed, a
story that has floated his political career. Yet driving this deployment of a
homophobic anti-imperialist progrom has been a shrewd plan to disempower
a rapidly growing civil society in Zimbabwe. Mugabe’s repressive
campaigns attacking homosexuals have supported an ever radiating set of
attacks against women, political opponents and white farmers. One way to
read this trajectory is to see that the assault on homosexuality as a principal
entry point in the creation of a culture of intolerance. Here, as elsewhere,
sex has been looked to as a particularly useful transfer point for the
consolidation of post-colonial power.
I then turn to Egypt and recent government-led campaigns of public
criminal prosecutions of men alleged to be gay. It is tempting to read these
public spectacles as events similar to those being undertaken in central and
east African nations: the Egyptian government bluntly demonstrating its
Islamic credentials to a domestic and pan Arab audience, and in so doing,
consolidating its own power. Yet, closer examination reveals that these
show trials emerged as part of an ongoing post- colonial struggle within
Egypt that began in the 1930s with the repeal of British colonial laws
licensing prostitution. Against this history, a set of homosexual social and
legal subjects have been created by the Mubarak government, and once so
formed and disciplined, “human rights” rides into the rescue to liberate them
from social and legal opprobrium. Here as in Zimbabwe, rights get pitted
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against custom and culture. Thus, the assistance of the international human
rights establishment has further reinforced post-colonial nationalist rhetoric
that located individual rights as a Western norm that threatens to undermine
authentic African culture.
George Mosse, Ann Stoler and others have observed a productive,
if not reproductive, relationship between sexuality and nationalism. (Mosse
1985; Stoler 1995; Parker et al 1992) Stoler has noted that “the distinction
between normality and abnormality, between bourgeois respectability and
sexual deviance, and between moral degeneracy and eugenic cleansing
were the elements of a discourse that made unconventional sex a national
threat and thus put a premium on managed sexuality for the health of the
state.” (1995: 34) My project here is to illuminate not only the validity of
this observation, but also the circumstances under which a form of statesponsored biopolitics calls up unconventionally sexed subjects in the service
of the project of statecraft. Thus, sex can be usefully put to work, as I
have discussed elsewhere, (Franke 1998) as a structural component of postcolonial nation building in moments when nationalism gives way to nativism.
1

I. Disciplinary Administration of African National Sexual
Citizenship in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe
For Benedict Anderson nationalism is best understood as more
similar to kinship or religion than liberalism or fascism. (Anderson 1983: 15)
Surely this is true of Robert Mugabe’s approach to nation building in postcolonial Zimbabwe. Mugabe has sold to his people a notion of an
independent and sovereign Zimbabwe that has rested upon the idea of
indigenization, yet where some people are more indigenous than others.
(Meredith 2002: 129) While this is not an uncommon post-colonial nationbuilding strategy, Mugabe has undertaken such a task in a manner that
explicitly constructs “national identity not on the basis of its own intrinsic
properties but as a function of what it (presumably) is not. Implying ‘some
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element of alterity for its definition,’ a nation ineluctably ‘shaped by what
is opposes.’” (Parker et al 1992: 5) In Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, post-colonial
nationalism, once an effective approach to rule, has given way to crude
nativism as his regime became vulnerable to increasing domestic and
extraterritorial pressure.
The difference against which Mugabe has
constituted Zimbabwean kinship and nativism has been, of course, racial in
nature, but Mugabe has used sexuality to consolidate power in a postcolonial regime threatened both extraterritorially by the likes of the World
Bank, and domestic ally by a growing political opposition and expanding
institutions of civil society. As Oliver Phillips has argued, in contrast to a
post-apartheid South Africa that has sought to accommodate difference and
create an open, heterogeneous society, Mugabe’s approach has been to
imagine Zimbabwe as a homogeneous community whose very being is
threatened by diversity and disunity. (Phillips 1997) “Politically and socially,
Zimbabwe has become much more ‘inward-looking’ than is South Africa.”
(Jacobs 1998) At key moments, that disunity and isolation has taken sexual
form. Aeneas Chigwedere, a member of Mugabe’s cabinet, put it thus:
What is at issue in cultural terms is a conflict of interest between
the whole body, which is the Zimbabwean community and part of
that body represented by individuals or groups of individuals ... The
whole body is more important than any single dispensable part.
When your finger starts festering and becomes a danger to the
body you cut if off. – The homosexuals are the festering finger.
(Chigwedere 1995: 14)
In Zimbabwe, formerly Rhodesia, a white majority government
declared independence from Britain in 1965, and whites grabbed the most
valuable resources in the country, leaving blacks to struggle in extreme
poverty on unproductive land. A protracted war for liberation ensued in
which land redistribution was one of the central issues. In 1980 the British
helped broker a resolution to the war for liberation from white rule, and
when elections were held, Robert Mugabe, leader of the Zimbabwe African
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National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF), the dominant
movement, won a resounding victory. (Meredith 2002: 39)

liberation

For a short while Mugabe’s government held out hope of offering
the Zimbabwean people a peaceful and relatively prosperous transition
away from British rule to independence. Promising reconciliation with the
white Rhodesians who remained in the country after the elections, Mugabe
initially reached out to the former white leadership in a manner that caught
most white elites by surprise. Yet, after 18 months, Mugabe declared that
“the honeymoon is over” and he unleashed vicious attacks against whites
as well as his political competition. (Ibid: 52-57) Ongoing attacks against
Mugabe from South Africa on account of his Marxist politics, and the
adoption of an Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) in 1991
led to increases in interest rates and inflation, which problems were
compounded by drought in 1992 and 1995. Land reform was not integrated
into the ESAP, while large scale commercial farmers were the principal
beneficiaries of reforms promoting agricultural exports. The stock market
fell and manufacturing contracted by 40 percent between 1992 and 1996.
By 1997, the Mugabe government was faced with a serious economic and
political crisis, with attendant public strikes, increased violence and
increasing demands to wrest control of the most productive land from white
former Rhodesians who had been grandfathered out of land reform in the
1980 settlement brokered by the British. (Dashwood 2000; Human Rights
Watch 2001)
While Mugabe had always used racial and political differences to
establish the authenticity and authority of his government, in 1995 he
nominated a new threat to the identity of integrity of Zimbabwean society:
homosexuality. Against a backdrop of escalating political, social and
economic chaos, that year Mugabe began a public campaign against
lesbians and gay men, actively encouraging the national press to report
negatively on issues relating to homosexuality, and speaking out himself in
ways that invited violence against gay men and lesbians.
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2

He ordered the 1995 Zimbabwe International Book Fair to ban an exhibit
by the civil rights group Gays & Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ). Lesbians
and gay men were "sexual perverts" who are "worse than dogs and pigs",
claimed Mugabe.
He warned homosexuals to leave the country
"voluntarily" or face "dire consequences." (ANC 1996) Soon afterwards,
Mugabe urged the public to track down and arrest lesbians and gay men.
Since these incitements, men and women perceived to be gay or lesbian
have been beaten up, fire-bombed, arrested, interrogated and threatened
with death.
Mugabe justified these remarks on the ground that
homosexuality is "un-African", describing it as "coming from so-called
developed nations," labeling homosexuality "a white problem." “Let them
be gay in the US, Europe and elsewhere ... They shall be sad people here.”
(Dunton & Palmberg 1996: 13) Surely, none of his domestic or international
troubles could be traced back to same-sex sexual practices, yet Mugabe
devoted considerable time and vitriol to the “problem” of gay people in
Zimbabwe, and many observers, both domestically and internationally, held
the view that Mugabe unleashed such a homophobic tantrum as a way to
distract attention away from the government’s growing economic and
political problems. Of course, the growth in visibility of gays, and to a lesser
extent lesbians, in Zimbabwe in the mid-1990s provides some explanation
for why Mugabe chose this group at this time to vilify in such a public way.
Perhaps more important, the aggressive imposition, if not, invention
of traditional and authentic Zimbabwean culture through the assertion of
heterosexuality arose at a time in which Zimbabwe had lost a normative
antipodal anchor against which it had asserted its own superior identity:
Apartheid South Africa. Prior to 1991,
not only did the apartheid government provide Zimbabwe with an
external military, economic and political threat on which to focus,
but it presented the Zimbabwean government with a moral high
ground easily occupied. Both of these factors provided a moralpolitical impetus and a certain cohesion to government and society
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in a newly liberated Zimbabwe, as well as sometimes excusing or
distracting from internal problems. (Phillips 1997: 481)
The dissolution of apartheid in Zimbabwe’s neighbor to the south withdrew
the specter of an evil empire with which to contrast Mugabe’s civic,
African and political virtue. As the new South Africa basked in the warm
glow of international attention and favor, Mugabe sought ways to retain
prominence in southern Africa as well as internationally. By positioning
himself as a pan-African leader whose normative commitments and values
derived from traditionally African customary law, he could contrast himself
with the cosmopolitan, multi-cultural and distinctly modern post-Apartheid
South Africa.
3
To this end, state-sponsored hostility to homosexuality as a modern,
colonial imported identity proved to be a clever move that was part of a
larger project of collapsing the state with the traditional African nation such
that opposition to the state could be framed as anti-African. Phillips has
made similar observations about the utility of homophobia to Mugabe’s
regional and international designs. (1997)
By the mid 1990s members of the ruling ZANU PF party in
parliament spoke out against "the evil and iniquitous practice of
homosexualism and lesbianism." One party member declared, "I would like
to call for all traditional forces in this country to rally behind the State
President in the eradication of homosexualism. I feel that all those who
know homos in this country should make them be brought before the courts
of law and be tried for their evil activity." Border Gezi, the governor of
Mashonaland Central Province, declared that gays and lesbians have
"something wrong in their heads" and that homosexuality is completely alien
to Zimbabwean culture. "They have no right to practice homosexuality in
our country," he said. "If they don't like it, they can leave." (BBC News
1998)
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Of course, Mugabe’s assertion of authentic African heterosexuality
dissolves under the slightest pressure. The notion that human beings
possessed a sexuality, such that it could be organized into homo and hetero
sexualities, was itself an artifact of British colonial rule. (Phillips 2000: 24)
Phillips provides ample evidence of a range of same-sex sexual practices
that took place across the African continent in the pre-colonial period.
(1997: 474) So too have a number of other scholars. (Evans-Pritchard
1970; Epprecht 1998; Talbot 1967: 35-6; De Rachewiltz 1964: 280) Prior
to the civilizing missions of the colonial occupation in Rhodesia, human
sexuality was understood in reproductive terms that were constitutive of
kinship networks and familial wealth. Sexual identity of object choice
framed in terms of desire was never the organizing force behind human
sexuality. “What was important was consequential physical activity rather
than projected cognitive desire.” (Phillips 1997: 475) Thus, the Mugabe
government’s assertion of an authentic, pre-colonial African sexuality
presupposes an approach to sexuality that has no African roots, and the
campaign against gay people in Zimbabwe was undertaken, in significant
part, through the enforcement of, if not merely reference to, laws
criminalizing homosexuality that had been enacted by the British during
colonial rule. (Phillips 1997: 476-477; International Gay and Lesbian Human
Rights Commission 1996)
While homo sex existed in Zimbabwe prior to Mugabe’s strategic
interpellation of a gay threat,
he has introduced the word and concept of a ‘sexuality’ into a
previously virginal public discourse; he has been a virulent
propagandist for the whole concept of a binary division, where
those boundaries were previously blurred. This is not to suggest
that Zimbabwe is now flooded with self-identified same-sex lovers
– it is simply to suggest that he has participated in the constitution
of a new identity – one that is individualised, sexualised, and in this
form, historically marginalised.
Further, by publicising his

-10-

Sexual Tensions of Post-Empire
homophobia President Mugabe has given an identity to many who
were previously ignorant of or uncaring about it. (Phillips 2000: 31)
The heterosexual/homosexual binary that undergirds Mugabe’s efforts in
this regard rests, to be sure, on the stability of other binaries as well, such
as that of male and female. But these distinctions, and the heteromasculine
norms that they assume, have not been as historically stable on the African
continent as Mugabe presupposes. Traditionally, the gendered concepts of
“woman” and “man” had some play in their joints depending upon a range
of social and cultural felicities or infelicities. (Colson 1958) Women could
be released from marriage to an impotent man, as he was treated socially
as another woman. (Gluckman 1967) The Nuer people along the upper Nile
as well as some Zulu people have had traditions by which important women
could marry other women by giving marriage-cattle for their brides, and the
more powerful women in the marriage would be considered the father of
the wife’s children begotten by some male kinsman of the female husband.
(Gluckman 1967; Murray 1998; Amadiume 1987) Carrier and Murray have
written that “woman-woman marriage – in which one woman pays
brideprice to acquire a husband’s rights to another woman – has been
documented in more than thirty African populations. (1998) Sudarkasa has
found that there is a general de-emphasis on gender in ‘traditional’ African
societies and a corresponding emphasis on status (‘personal standing’),
which is usually, but not always, determined by wealth. (1986 p. 97) Thus,
the authentic African heterosexuality that Mugabe asserts is being
threatened by the presence of homosexuality in Zimbabwe is largely a myth
of his own making, as are the notions of heteromasculinity and
heterofemininity that undergird it.
Phillips’ conclusion, in this regard, is surely right. He argues the
Mugabe’s efforts to denigrate homosexuality as unZimbabwean and
unAfrican have two designs. First to situate homosexuality as European,
and therefore depraved and evil in its power to corrupt other cultures, and
second to mark homosexuality as white. In Mugabe’s annual New Years
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address on January 1, 2000, he declared to a crowd of celebrants “We
cannot have a man marrying a man or a woman marrying a woman here.
What an abomination, a rottenness of culture, real decadence of culture ...
Once you impose a foreign culture on us then you naturally evoke the devil
in us.” (ANC Daily News Briefing 2000) Thus, argues Phillips, “the
signifier of homosexuality is used to denounce ‘white culture’, and the
colouring of homosexuals as ‘white’ is used to denounce them as nonZimbabwean.” (1997: 472)
The racial dimensions of Mugabe’s interpellation/awakening of
Zimbabwean gays is also rather ironic. Prior to 1995 when Mugabe
initiated his most vicious vitriol toward homosexuality GALZ had been a
predominantly white, male organization. As pressure on GALZ mounted,
white men left the organization, while black gay men and lesbians in the
cities sought refuge in the organization from increasing public and private
pressure. What is more, GALZ’s presence is no longer exclusively in the
urban space of Harare. In 1999 it opened a drop-in center in Bulawayo in
the southern part of the country, and another space in Mutare is also being
contemplated. This outreach has resulted in a substantial increase in the
number of poorer black men from rural areas and townships joining the
organization. At the same time, GALZ’s Executive Director points out that
it’s membership is made up of very few, if any, middleclass business people,
since “they have more to lose” from associating publically with other gay
men. (Berthiaume 2003) Oliver Phillips reports that some white members
left out of fear of Mugabe’s call for violence, other white men left due to
their own discomfort/racism with the increased presence of black men in
GALZ. In any event, for GALZ to be politically effective it had to be
perceived as more of a black than white group, and had to have black
leadership.
4
Thus, Mugabe’s targeting of GALZ has had the effect of calling up a
generation of black gay men and some lesbians - a population he maintained
did not exist – while marginalizing white gay men in the group.
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Human rights activists have critiqued the Mugabe government’s
attacks on homosexuality as a means to distract attention away from the
nation’s political and economic problems. So too, this campaign has been
interpreted through a post-colonial lens, playing to black Zimbabweans’
notions of authentic African sexuality and identifying gayness with other
imperialist threats in the form of the World Bank, white landowners and
other Rhodesian residue. The perversity of the way in which homosexuality
has been used by Mugabe in connection with his larger political projects is
no better exemplified than his accusation that the British Government had
set "gay gangsters" on him over his land reforms. (Malala 1999; Mugabe
1999b; Mugabe 1999c) Mugabe thus set himself up as a besieged African
leader being undermined by the (gay) hand of a prior colonial power, while
he tries to restore land to his black (male) constituents. He effectively
turned to sexuality to produce a normative heterosexual citizen set off
against a gay threat to Zimbabwean society in such a way that “‘relations
of subjugation can produce subjects,’ defined by their varied transgressions
as “‘internal enemies’ of society and state.” (Stoler 1995: 35-36) These
internal enemies have served as the new antipodal point against which
Mugabe’s Zimbabwe could define itself by reference to what it was not.
In some ways, what concerns human rights workers the most is the
dexterity with which Mugabe has used the attacks on gay people as a
stepping stone for broader attacks on his rivals and for consolidating his
dwindling power. Mugabe correctly anticipated that the human rights
community in Zimbabwe would not respond to the attacks on gay men and
lesbians, indeed, many did not regard this as a human rights issue at all.
5
Having met scant opposition to his policies attacking lesbians and gays,
Mugabe moved on to gain further political advantage in his ongoing efforts
to undermine women’s rights. Given how fundamental land distribution and
redistribution is to Zimbabwean politics, particularly to supporters of the
ruling ZANU PF party, Mugabe undertook several land reform policies that
explicitly disempowered women. While the Zimbabwean constitution has
since 1996 prohibited sex discrimination, it has exempted all family law,
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customary and personal law from the reach of those equality provisions.
Women’s rights groups have lobbied heavily to have land permits
automatically registered in the name of both husbands and wives. This
reform would protect women from the common practice of their sons selling
the family home upon the death of their fathers - usually without notice to
their mothers, thus leaving their widowed mothers homeless and destitute.
(Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2001b) In 1998 the minister in
charge of resettlement, Joseph Msika, rejected women's demands that
property be registered in the names of both spouses, and for the five million
hectares earmarked for redistribution to be given to single, unmarried
women or women heads of households. He justified these policies on the
ground that granting women land rights would create domestic (household)
unrest. (Msika 1999)
The government’s policies on women and land ownership
operationalized what had been long standing informal policy with respect to
women’s rights claims in Zimbabwe. Shortly after the Supreme Court held
in the 1984 Katekwe case that seduction damages (or loss of lobolo or
bride price
6
) was a legal asset owned by the seduced female, not her male guardian,
Mugabe joked in Parliament “that if his sister were to get married, he would
demand lobolo and if the intended husband pointed to the Katekwe
judgement, he would say to him, ‘O.K. That is the judgement. Do you want
to marry my sister or not?’” (Katekwe 1984; Ncube 1983-84: 217)
Mugabe’s response to the Katekwe Court’s decision must be understood
in light of the history of lobolo in Zimbabwe. Under the African Marriage
Act, a colonial regulation of marriage, Africans who wished to marry in
Rhodesia had to obtain a certificate from a colonial officer who was
required to satisfy himself that sufficient lobolo had been paid. “In this
way the colonial state entrenched the institution of lobolo/roora by making
it a condition precedent for a valid marriage.” (Ncube 1987: 202) Thus
Mugabe’s comments regarding lobolo reproduced the colonial state’s
insistence on the presence of brideprice to validate a marriage. Here as in
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the context of homosexuality, Mugabe privileges a notion of gendered
culture that belies the actual history of lobolo in Zimbabwe.
The government’s official use of women as a wedge issue in land
policy gained juridical power after Mugabe packed the Supreme Court with
his supporters in 1999.
7
(Rotberg 2001) Immediately thereafter, the Supreme Court ruled on a
woman’s right to inherit her father’s property after her half brother evicted
her from her deceased father’s house. The Court unanimously rejected her
claim on the ground that the “nature of African society” dictates that
women are not equal to men, especially in family relationships. Under
customary law, only men can inherit and all family members are subordinate
to the male head of the family. “Women should never be considered adults
within the family, but only as a junior male or teenager.” (Magaya 1999)
The court carefully framed its ruling as necessarily driven by the customary
law of the tribe in whic h the deceased father had been a member, and
tersely dismissed domestic laws and international treaties that required sex
equality as imposing colonial, not indigenous, law and norms on the
Zimbabwean people.
8
In so doing, the court chose to elevate customary law over sex based
discrimination, thus privileging group rather than individual-based rights. But
in so doing, it failed to acknowledge that the “customary law” that it sought
to protect was itself the product of colonial rule and interpretation. Ncumbe
has shown that during the colonial period, courts that sought to preserve
customary rules of domestic relations did so by making up those customary
rules to serve present interests, or by “updating” those rules to conform to
contemporary political and economic needs. (1987) In a family law case
decided by the Zimbabwean Supreme Court in 1971, the court justified
modification of customary law on the grounds that:
The changes in the economic relationship of a family interest which
have been brought about by Africans entering a cash economy and
earning money in urban employment have to be recognized by this
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court, so that it will not grow out of touch with reality.
(Mombeshora 1971)
Thus, “customary law” has a genealogy tainted by colonialism just as do all
other aspects of Zimbabwean culture.
The Magaya ruling resulted in fifty-eight year old Venia Magaya
being evicted from her home by her father’s second wife’s son, and it has
had devastating implications for women in Zimbabwe, given that 70 per cent
of the agricultural labor force in Zimbabwe are women who work on the
soil but cannot own land in their own right - a circumstance which is itself
a legacy of colonialism that the Mugabe government has amplified, not a
natural African order that ought be further concretized by and through
something termed “customary law.” (Jacobs 2000; Zimbabwe Human
Rights NGO Forum 2001b) Schmidt has observed, in this regard, that:
European missionaries promoted male-dominated farming by
introducing plows, oxen, new agricultural techniques, and improved
seeds to men alone. Moreover, missionaries fostered the ideal of
patriarchal, patrilineal, male-headed households, with wives playing
an uncharacteristically subordinate role. (1992: 5)
These colonial policies sought to alter tribal kinship-based structures of labor
that were matrilineal in nature and favored women economically, in so far
as women had been able to command the labor of their sons and son-inlaws. (Ibid) The shift urged by colonial forces in the years following the
mid-1930s away from cotton production and toward cash crops and copper
extraction had the effect of deteriorating women’s ability to control male
labor, as that labor was now being conscripted into colonial production. This
gendered reorganization of labor took place at the same time that marriagerelated “customary” law evolved in response. Brideservice, the access of
wives to their son in law’s labor, gave way to bridewealth or lobolo. Thus,
during this period the demands and incentives of colonial governance and
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control of the economy had the effect of locating technology, capital, and
labor increasingly as the “property and prerogative of men.” (Wright 1983:
85) The end result of this system was that young African men worked as
migrant wage laborers in the European economy, African women engaged
in agricultural production in the reserves, and older African men maintained
law and order at the household and village levels. (Schmidt 1983: 6)
After the resumption of black rule in Zimbabwe, the government
sought to restructure society by reducing poverty levels, increasing
agricultural and other productivity, and developing human resources.
(Government of Zimbabwe 1981) Land redistribution figured as a
centerpiece of these policies, however white land was redistributed to black
“heads of households.” (Jacobs 1998) Thus,
in some respects this showpiece of state policy continues practices
that were current under colonialism ... The fundamental provision
that permits are held by the ‘household head’ – deemed to be the
male spouse both by the Government and the popular opinion –
means that it is difficult for gender relations to have changed
dramatically. (Jacobs 1991: 522)
The significance of the Magaya court’s reliance on “customary law” must
be understood in light of this gendered history of agrarian labor and land
ownership. Thus, the “authentic African norms” that are invoked by the
Supreme Court to structurally deny property rights to women can be traced
back to colonial rule as much as, if not more than, pre-colonial tribal custom.
(Mushunje 2001)
Mugabe moved on from there when he invited violence against his
political opposition,
9
supported extrajudicial seizure of lands owned by white farmers and
defended the violence perpetrated against both the white farm owners and
their black farm employees.
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10

In the wake of these escalating tactics, the Zimbabwean human rights
community has endured violent and sustained attacks. (Zimbabwe Human
Rights NGO Forum 2001a)
Mugabe has demonstrated how effective it can be for a
government under enormous pressure to create a climate of intolerance and
lawlessness by starting with sexual minorities and working out from there
to the rest of civil society. As Scott Long has observed about various
Southern African leaders, “the government used the spectre of sexual
perversion to discredit the whole of civil society.” (Long 2002) While at the
same time, Mugabe effectively positioned gay men and lesbians as the
“vanguard of, and metaphor for, a neo-colonial invasion.” (Long 2003: 4)
Just as “nationalist rhetoric makes ‘women’ the pure and ahistorical signifier
of ‘interiority’,” (Radhakrishnan 1992: 84) it strategically renders sexual
pervert as the -ur subject of exteriority. While “‘woman’ becomes the mute
but necessary allegorical ground for the transactions of nationalist history,”
(ibid) gayness comes into focus not as ground but as figure - as other whose assimilation into the whole is regarded as a threat to the nation.
In Zimbabwe, the state has gained an official sexuality “free” from
colonial contamination, threats to the ruling regime have become sexualized,
and sexual discipline is revealed to be a very effective tool of governance
for a fragile state seeking to solidify new power. All of this has been
undertaken as part of the process by which Zimbabwean politics have
moved from nationalist to nativist. In this process, the native becomes the
exalted post-colonial subject who is constituted, in significant part, by
heterosexuality. By contrast, the homosexual is marked rhetorically and
legally as colonial and modern. Thus the future of Zimbabwe is figured in
a turn to a phantasmatic past. This enables the homosexual in post-colonial
Zimbabwe to emerge as the smudge of colonial erasure - it’s that messy,
dirty bit that is left on the page as the rest of the colonial story has being
unwritten. In the name of “cultural authenticity” Mugabe’s policies have
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both created that smudge and put it to work to substantial gain for his
regime.
II. The Moral Enclosure of Sexual Threats in Egypt
In May 2001, 52 men in Cairo were arrested for suspected
consensual same sex sexual acts. They were tried before an Egyptian
Emergency State Security Court on charges of obscene behavior and
contempt for religion, as Egyptian law does not explicitly criminalize
homosexual conduct. The Emergency State Security Courts were created
in 1981 after the assassination of President Anwar Sadat, and since then his
successor Hosni Mubarak has ruled under a state of emergency authorizing
suspension of a range of civil and political rights. (Human Rights Watch
2001)
An unprecedented state-s ponsored media campaign publicized the
arrests and trials of the accused - their names, places of work and, in some
cases, pictures were published in the state owned media. (Bahgat 2001)
Some of the men were arrested in the early hours of May 11, 2001,
following a raid by police and State Security Intelligence personnel on a
party held aboard the Queen Boat moored on the Nile in Cairo’s Zamalek
district. Others had not even been on the boat, but had been thrown in with
the Queen Boat defendants after being picked up on Cairo streets.
11
Initial reports in the Egyptian media suggested that those arrested were
part of a “Satanic cult” and that they were being held under charges of
“exploiting religion to promote extreme ideas to create strife and belittle the
revealed religions.” It subsequently became clear that the arrests were
carried out because the men were suspected of engaging in consensual
sexual activity with other men. The detainees were subjected to forensic
examinations, apparently in order to determine whether they had engaged
in anal intercourse, and were forced to “say my name, my job, my address
and say ‘I am gay.’” (Lussier 2003; International Gay and Lesbian Human
Rights Commission 2001a) In November, 2001, the defendants were
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brought into court and were promptly placed in a cage in the courtroom
where they stood wearing masks and hoods they had constructed out of
their shirts and underwear in order to disguise their identities from the media
present in the court. Indeed, only the media was allowed in the courtroom
when the judge read out the verdicts and sentences. Families and friends
of the accused were not permitted to be present, and their cries from the
hall and banging on the courtroom doors rumbled in the courtroom as the
judge began the proceedings. The judge read the court’s verdict in a
whisper that no one in the room could hear, indeed for some days many
defendants did not know whether they had been found guilty or what
sentence they had been given.
In the end, twenty three of the fifty two defendants were sentenced
to between one and five years of hard labor. (International Gay and Lesbian
Human Rights Commission 2001b) However, in May, 2002 the State
Security Office for the Ratification of Verdicts overturned most of the
Cairo 52 convictions and released 21 of the men who had been found guilty
of the “habitual practice of debauchery.” The court took this action on the
ground that this crime did not merit trial before the special emergency court,
and ordered that these men, as well as those who had been acquitted in the
Cairo 52 trial, be retried in a civilian court. (International Gay and Lesbian
Human Rights Commission 2002) The retrial took place in the Qasr Al-Nil
misdemeanours court - a civilian criminal court - however the judge held no
hearing, took no testimony, refused to permit the defense lawyers to cross
examine the arresting officers, nor allowed them to submit written
memoranda or oral arguments to the court. Relying entirely on the forensic
evidence and coerced confessions of the defendants, in March of 2003 the
civilian judge again found the 21 defendants guilty of “habitual debauchery”.
He then issued harsher sentences than had the state security court. (Lussier
2003) The defense attorney commented in the Egyptian press that he felt
the civilian judge “was trying to send a message that the Emergency State
Security Court’s verdict had been a better option.” (Al-Akram Weekly
Online 2003)

-20-

Sexual Tensions of Post-Empire
The day after the sentencing four additional men were arrested and
charged with “habitual debauchery.” Since that time scores of similar
arrests have been made, including 62 men at a well known gay cruising area
on the evening of August 28, 2003. When the 62 men were loaded into
police wagons, law enforcement officers yelled to onlookers: “Look at these
faggots! The country's become full of faggots!” (Ahbab News 2003)
Amnesty International reports that suspects arrested on charges of
debauchery are highly likely to face torture and beatings in prison, including
falaka beatings on the soles of the feet with a stick. (Amnesty International
2002) Many of these prosecutions have resulted in convictions. In July,
2003 an appeals court reversed the conviction of eleven men, but as they
did so one of the judges told the defendants: “We are so disgusted with you,
we can't even look at you. What you did is a major sin, but unfortunately the
case has procedural errors and the court had to acquit all of you.”
(Associated Press 2003)
How to understand these very public scandalous show trials
undertaken by the Egyptian government in the press, the Emergency
Security Court, and now Egyptian civil courts? As in Zimbabwe, some
have observed that the Mubarak government desired to divert public
attention away from economic problems and a growing liquidity crisis while
the government attempted to impose new sales taxes. (Bahgat 2001: 2)
One could also imagine that the government had ample reason to shore up
its Islamic credentials domestically as it found itself increasingly allied with
the U.S. government in its campaign against terrorism. Scandalous sex
trials might do the trick. Some human rights groups have interpreted the
prosecution of the Cairo 52 as an indicator of how Islamic societies treat
sexuality more generally.
While all these explanations may contain partial truths, the Cairo 52
case represents something much more complicated that Mubarak’s attempt
to distract his people from domestic economic problems, or an instance of
Islamic sexual repression. Situating this case in the history of both Islam
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and the legal regulation of sex in Egypt reveals how the public prosecution,
at this moment, of men suspected of homosexual acts serves the interests
of the Egyptian secular government’s post-colonial struggle for
independence - in the face of both domestic and international threats of
instability.
Indeed, these prosecutions may advance the Mubarak
government’s pattern of repressing islamic activism on the one hand, and
securing the symbolic purity of Egyptian culture on the other.
The laws under which the Cairo 52 were prosecuted find their roots
in post-colonial campaigns against prostitution. Egyptian law does not
expressly criminalize homosexual acts. However, the charges that were
brought against these men came under Article 9(c) of Law No. 10 of 1961
on the Combat of Prostitution. When the British occupied Egypt in 1882,
they imposed a form of “regulationism” of prostitution. (Dunne 1996: 195252) Rather than outlawing it, which would have comported with Christian
colonial moralizing in evidence elsewhere, the British set out to regulate
legalized prostitution - requiring the registration of prostitutes, weekly
medical inspections of sex workers, and restricting the sex trade to certain
licensed establishments. (van Nieuwkerk 1995: 45; Dunne 1996: 139) In
Egypt, as in many other areas colonized during this period, prostitution was
legalized, in significant part, for the benefit of European settlers and soldiers.
12
Dunne’s research shows that the number of registered prostitutes in
Cairo jumped from 921 in 1914 to 2,540 in 1915, and then fell off as the war
wound down.
13
(1996: 206) Legalized and regulated prostitution remained a vital part of
Egyptian urban life through the remainder of British rule, notwithstanding
reform and abolition campaigns undertaken during that same period in
Britain and in many of its other colonies.
Egyptian nationalists, however, seized on prostitution immediately
after national independence as an example of the social ills that befell Egypt
under British occupation. (Rizk 2001) In February of 1925 Egyptian feminist
and Wafd party leader Sha’rawi Huda declared in the national women’s
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newspaper which she founded, L’Egytienne, that the struggle against
lic ensed brothels was a matter of national honor, and that the abolitionist
cause was “patriotic and humanitarian.”
14
(ArabicNews 1999; Dunne 1996: 300)
Shortly thereafter, Islamic nationalists began a campaign to link the
abolition of prostitution to Egyptian nationalism and Islam. (Dunne 1996:
302) The abolition of prostitution became a principle goal of de-colonization,
and the ultimate repeal of laws legalizing prostitution after British
occupation was explicitly understood to represent a rejection of the
promiscuity of alien sexual culture, and the purging of alien sex workers
from Egypt’s urban spaces.
15

Yet the independent Egyptian government did not repeal the British
laws licensing prostitution and regulating brothels until 1949, fully twenty
seven years after independence. Some of the delay can be attributed to
the presence of allied troops in Egypt during the Second World War. (van
Nieuwkerk 1995: 47) And much time was devoted to the work of the
Commission of Enquiry, charged in 1932 with the task of considering
alternatives to regulated prostitution. (Dunne 1996: 306-311) The Muslim
Brotherhood began to play a role in Egyptian politics in the 1930s, urging a
reorientation of the culture in keeping with Islamic principles and away from
the liberal, European secularism that had characterized Wafdist government
and politics. (Vatikiotis 1969: 315-316) Their influence took hold in the late
1940s and early 1950s. Prime Minister Ibrahim Abdel Hadi Pasha issued
a military decree closing the brothels in 1949, in part in response to criticism
the government had received from the Muslim Brotherhood regarding the
government’s policy permitting prostitution, gambling and drinking of
alcohol. (Skovgaard-Petersen 1997; Vatikiotis 1969: 328-330) During this
same period, anti-British, anti-western, and pro-Islamic sentiment fueled the
creation of the Young Men’s Muslim Association (YMMA), a group
explicitly founded to counter the missionary practices of the YMCA.
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(Vatikiotis 1969: 326) Without question, legal reforms during this period
were undertaken for complex sets of reasons, however two important
concerns had a significant effect upon the government’s approach to
prostitution after independence: anti-imperialist Egyptian nationalism
articulated as sexual purity, and the secular state defending itself against the
growing power of the Muslim Brotherhood.
These two concerns figure prominently in the prosecution of the
Cairo 52 under modern Egyptian criminal law targeting prostitution. First,
the Emergency Security Courts in which these men were tried were
originally set up to try Islamic fundamentalists. Since 1992 hundreds of
civilians, mostly alleged members or supporters of al-Gihad (Holy Struggle,
known abroad as Egyptian Islamic Jihad), al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic
Group), or Al-Ikhwan Al-Moslemoon
(the Muslim Brotherhood), have been referred to military courts. These
trials, sometimes held en masse, have been criticized by Human Rights
Watch and other human rights organizations for failing to meet international
fair trial standards: basic rights, such as the right to appeal, have been
routinely violated, even in cases where the defendants faced and were
punished with the death penalty. (Human Rights Watch 2001) The well
publicized prosecution of the Cairo 52 in the very same courts sent a
message to an international audience that the security courts do not exist
exclusively to harass and persecute the religious opposition. Indeed, these
courts can be used to prosecute the very groups that the Islamists hate the
most, and in the case of the Cairo 52, meted out greater due process and
less harsh sentences than the civilian courts to which the cases were later
referred.
What is more, in recent years of national economic contraction,
Islamic groups have stepped in to provide social services previously
provided by the Egyptian state. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood and
similar organizations have gained popularity among the Egyptian people.
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Although officially banned by the Egyptian government since 1954, the
Muslim Brotherhood has 17 out of a total of 454 seats in the Egyptian
Parliament, making it the second largest party in the parliament after the
ruling National Democratic Party. (Howeidy 2000; Ali 2003) Thus, the
Mubarak government has ample incentive to undertake a public campaign
to appease the supporters of the Brotherhood, and men accused of
homosexuality would serve well. The government guessed correctly that
the Egyptian human rights community would be reluctant to come to their
aid.
Finally, anti-imperialist rhetoric has figured in the Cairo 52
prosecutions just as it did in the efforts to reform the colonial prostitution
laws after independence. This time, the alien sexual culture to be kept at
bay is the “West,” not merely the British. Shortly after the European
Parliament issued a resolution in April 2003 condemning human rights
violations in Egypt, explicitly referencing the arrests and prosecutions of
men charged with homosexuality, Mustafa Bakry, editor-in-chief of the
independent newspaper Al-Osbou’ wrote an editorial in which he charged
“that after Iraq and Syria, Egypt would be next in line, referring to the
criticisms directed by the European Parliament to sentences passed on
homosexuals in the famous ‘Queen Boat’ case in Cairo .. . ‘I do not find it
far- fetched to suppose that armies will one day be positioned, and warships
proceed, armed with UN Security Council resolutions, against an Egypt that
‘persecutes homosexuals’!” (European Parliament 2003; Sami 2003)
Thus, these prosecutions have been useful on a number of grounds:
it appears
to be a calculated gamble by an insecure regime. The crackdown
on gays, as diplomats and political analysts see it, reflects
government concern about growing freedom of expression in Egypt
- fueled by the proliferation of Internet chat rooms and Web sites
beyond the regime’s control. [Indeed, many of the supposedly gay
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men have been entrapped through internet chat rooms.] The
government may also have contrived the prosecutions to bolster its
Islamic credentials at a time when Egyptians are angered by an
imploding economy and the arrests of fundamentalists. The
strategy may be working. Although condemned abroad, the trial of
the ‘Cairo 52' has met with nearly universal approval at home.
(Hammer 2002)
In the fall of 2003, Pope Shenouda III, the leader of Egypt’s Coptic
Orthodox Church, told Egypt’s state-run Middle East news agency that he
supports the government’s efforts to root out the “plague” of homosexuality,
and that he had received death threats from gay rights groups during a
recent trip to Australia. (Al-Ahram 2003)
In Egypt, as in Zimbabwe, the moral enclosure of sex - be it
heterosexuality within monogamous marriage, prostitution or homosex - has
proven to be an effective tool of governance by a state under stress. Prior
to the mid-twentieth century, same sex sex between males was well know
and wide spread in Egypt. But only the passive partner (constructed within
the context of anal sex) was considered to be homosexual and was subject
to criminal laws prohibiting homosexual acts. (Dunne 1996 pp. 9-10)
Curiously, this definition of homosexuality has changed in recent years.
Through the Cairo 52 prosecutions, the government has adopted a more
“western” identity-based definition of gayness. Role no longer defines the
crime, sex of object choice does - and this is new in Muslim society.
16
Thus, at the moment that the Egyptian government has chosen to use
(homo)sex to consolidate and rehabilitate its power, it has done so by first
interpellating a western homosexual subject, and then caging him, parading
him before the public, and excising him from Egyptian culture. The moral
enclosure in which these gay outlaws in Egypt have been caged reflects a
kind of territorialization, or social mapping by a governmental power on the
sexualized male body.
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In a perverse twist of geopolitical interest convergence, the roundup
of allegedly gay men may have had the effect of adding legitimacy to the
state security courts and the expansion of the emergency powers of the
Egyptian state. The harsh sentence of the civilian criminal court on the
Cairo 52 came down right on the heels of the Mubarak government’s
successful effort to ram through the Egyptian parliament a provision to
extend the state of emergency for another three years -- aided in no small
part by President Bush’s global war on terrorism. This legislation included
reforms to the emergency court system, abolishing the court in which the
Cairo 52 had been convicted, while leaving in tact another security court
whose jurisdiction was limited to the most dangerous security cases. At the
same time, the Mubarak government expanded the jurisdiction of the power
of its regular courts - the courts in which the Cairo 52 had been retried and
more harshly convicted. The government justified the necessity for such
measures by reference to the rise in global terrorism since September 11th.
The Muslim Brotherhood and other members of the opposition government
opposed the extension on the ground that the powers it gave the government
had been us ed not to fight terrorists but to arrest Egyptian citizens for
demonstrating against the U.S.’s invasion of Iraq. (El-Din 2003) In this
they have proven correct. In August of 2003 the Mubarak government
initiated prosecutions against five men in the National Security Court based
on their anti-war activism generally, and “communicating with foreign
human rights organizations” specifically.
17
(Stork 2003; Allam 2003) While Human Rights Watch has expressed
concern over these changes to the Egyptian court system, the international
press has taken very little notice, aside from one short article in the New
York Times. (Allam 2003)
In Egypt, a western, gay pervert has been called up by the Mubarak
government as a convenient prop in the complex choreography that includes
the defense of authentic Egyptian culture, the containment of Islamist
groups in the private sector, and an ambivalent collaboration with the United
States in its so-called war on terrorism. It seems that the prosecution of the
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Cairo 52 - starting in the security courts, then moving them to the civilian
courts - served as a dry run for the reorganization of the Egyptian court
system’s jurisdiction over dissenters and outcasts. “By 2006, the
government won't need to renew the emergency law because its articles
are being written into the civil codes,” said the advocate, Hossam Bahgat,
director of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights. (Allam 2003).
Sexual accusation has supplied the justification by which qualities
deemed undesirable may be contained or excised. These domestic enemies
18
emerge first as an abstract legal category “the sodomite” or “the pervert
habituated to debauchery,” that is to be filled up with bodies - really, any
bodies - through an act of nominal violence with profound epistemic effects.
“You, and you, and you,” commands the state as it arrests Egyptian men off
the street, often randomly. Through these public acts of law enforcement,
sex is stamped on male bodies in an act whereby qualities deemed
undesirable may be contained or excised through sexual accusation by the
post-colonial state in its attempt first to define an idealized nation, and then
to defend that nation from “security threats.” (Heng and Devan 1992)

Conclusion
I offer these examples to show how in some circumstances it has
proven useful to construct a narrative about the nation that contains an
official national sexuality, and a nation that is populated by certain types of
sexualized subjects and citizens. These examples illustrate how sexuality
c an help define political culture, and that certain forms of nationalism are
operationalized through the management of threats that are easily imagined
in sexualized terms. The epistemic violence of rule in these moments can
be most effective when done through and by sex and sexuality.
The sexual accusation cultivated by the post-colonial nationalism in
evidence in Zimbabwe and Egypt reflects what might be understood as a
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form of reverse or internalized Orientalism. In both cases, the “object” of
post-colonial nationalist thought remains the Oriental, who “accepts and
adopts the same essentialist conception based on the distinction between
‘the East’ (and ‘the African’) and ‘the West’.” (Chatterjee 1986: 38-39)
In this post-colonial context, the repressive resolution of identity is
accomplished by framing local enemies that bear a metonymic relationship
to the “West.” At least in the instances I examine in this essay, gays or
perverts are interpellated through various legal techniques as new
subalterns, produced as an effect of nationalist, or even nativist, rhetoric.
T his sexualized threat then congeals in a certain kind of subjectivity that
reads politically and socially as depraved Others.
The sexualized subject emerges from within the political and legal
horizon created by the state. It is precisely the state’s effort to jettison a
particular past, to declare it over, and to cement a more authentic national
culture that renders sexual abjection the detritus of that national cleansing.
These states seek a false continuity with a pre-colonial past, which
continuity promises authenticity. But that authenticity is manufactured in
ways not terribly dissimilar from the imperial fabrication of customary law.
These two examples illustrate how crucial sexual alterity can be to the
project of statecraft when one older past is to be resurrected and another
more recent vanquished - surely these are dense transfer points for power.
Ironically, the sexual subjects that are the product of these state
practices are exactly the subjects that international human rights groups pick
up in their humanitarian radar when they scan the globe for human rights
abuses. In that sense, human rights groups have an odd stake in the
presence of gay subjects like those in Zimbabwe and Egypt. Indeed, they
assert a kind of jurisdiction over them that risks reifying, if not interpellating,
gay subjectivity in ways that tragically mirrors the power exerted by the
state. This is not to say that the gaze of the human rights agency is the
moral equivalent of the gaze of the state, but rather that the productive
effects of human rights advocacy are worthy of critical attention.
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NOTES

1. Comparative work of this kind always poses the risk of oversimplifying complex social histories and genealogies, if not worse,
skimming to achieve coherence across cultures and times. I do not
profess to be a scholar of either of the two examples I provide here,
others are far more familiar with the double histories of nationalism and
sexuality in Egypt, see e.g. Abu-Lughod 1998, Hatem 1998, Dadran
1995; and in Zimbabwe, see e.g. Phillips 1997 and 2000. I rely on the
first-hand accounts of these and other scholars in order to offer a
comparative analysis for the limited purpose of illuminating how at key
moments, and in two very different sites, the nation is imagined in ways
that depend upon an interesting interdependence between national and
sexual alterity.
2. Bornwell Chakaodza, the editor of the state owned newspaper The
Herald, said the media should attack homosexuality in order to help
protect Zimbabwean culture and family values. The Herald has also run
advertisements placed by Dr. Michael Mawema, a prominent
churchman, calling for a "crusade" against homosexuals, as "God
commands the death of sexual perverts." (Chakaodza 1998)
3. Just as Zimbabwe’s national identity was constructed, in part, by
imaging gays and lesbians as radical outsiders, South Africa took the
opposite track, reimagining them as constitutionalized insiders.
Mugabe’s project has been to imagine the Zimbabwean citizen as
African, whereas Mandela’s was to construct a South African citizen
as human. Thus you see a rich culture of human rights in South African
culture, and the rejection thereof in Zimbabwe. Indeed, Mugabe has
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characterized the notion of human rights as colonial in nature. Carl
Stychin develops these themes very thoughtfully in A Nation By Rights
(1998).
4. Personal correspondence with Oliver Phillips, December 6, 2003.
5. This is in contrast to the domestic human rights community’s
condemnation of similarly homophobic policies of Namibia’s President
Sam Nujoma, and Botswana’s ruling BDP party (Botswana
Democratic Party).
6. Lobolo “can be defined as the payment, in money or other material
forms, made by the son-in-law to the father or guardian of the woman
for the purpose of entering into a marriage with that woman. Until the
passage of the Legal Age of Majority Act [in 1982], an agreement as
to lobolo/roora was an essential requirement for a valid customary
marriage.” (Ncube 1987: 202)
7. Mugabe’s support for the members of his Supreme Court, especially
it’s white Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay, was short lived as he has
sought to oust the entire judiciary when the Court ruled against
Mugabe’s seizures of white owned land. (McGreal 2001) Since then,
he has replaced three members of the Court, including the Chief Justice,
with pro- ZANU PF judges.
8. The complexity of this issue revolves, in significant part, around
Zimbabwean law that requires that disputes as to land succession or
inheritance shall be governed by “the customs and usages of the tribe or
people to which [the deceased] belonged.” Section 68(1) of the
Administration of Estates Act. Yet, this exception to the general rule of
modern common or statutory law applying in legal disputes in
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Zimbabwe is an artifact of colonial rule. The British South African
Company settled Rhodesia under a charter granted by Queen Victoria
which held that in cases concerning ‘natives’, customary law would
apply so long as the particular custom was not deemed to be
“repugnant to natural justice or morality.” 1889 Charter of the British
South Africa Company. Mahmood Mamdani has noted this
reservation of family and property law to the domain of customary law
as characteristic of colonial approaches to governing the native.
(Mamdani 2001)
9. President Mugabe was named in a civil lawsuit in the U.S. seeking
damages for orchestrating “murder, torture, terrorism, rape, beatings,
and destruction of property ....” against his political opposition in
advance of the June 2000 parliamentary elections. (Tachiona 2001)
10. “We are going to take the land and we are not going to pay a cent
for the soil.” (Mugabe 1999a)
11. One man claimed that he had been arrested for selling watches
without a license at a coffee shop. Another said that the police had
arrested him while he was cleaning his motorbike on the grounds that he
could not produce identification papers. (Ashton 2003)
12. van Nieuwkerk notes how laws regulating prostitution were grossly
underenforced by British legal actors during World War I when Cairo
because a significant site where British, Australian and other troops
were stationed. (1995: 46-47) See also Ruiz 1997.
13. Eighty-four thousand British, Australian and New Zealand troops
were deployed to Egypt in January 1915. (Dunne 1996: 209)
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14. Omina Shakry has observed that turn of the century Egyptian
feminists, like Sha’rawi, “situated their own projects as a defense of
Islam and a critique of taqlid. Their projects were often
conceptualized as an illustration that ‘true Islam’ –that is, Islam
unadulterated by ‘traditional’ accretions, such as superstitious
practices–was entirely compatible with modernity.” (Shakry 1998:
148)
15. Those sex workers in Cairo who were foreign nationals, not a small
number, could not be regulated by Egyptian law as Capitulations
(bilateral treaties between Egypt and various European nations)
contained provisions that immunized Europeans from Egyptian law and
gave foreigners the right to be tried only in their own consular courts.
(van Nieuwkerk 1995: 45; Dunne 1996 pp. 143, 197-99; Ruiz 1997:
16)
16. Nevertheless, the men arrested on the Queen Boat were asked
whether they were passive or dominant actors in homo sex. “The men
interviewed said that during interrogations, usually conducted by
members of the Vice Squad, they were ordered to say whether they
were sexually "passive" or "dominant," even if they denied being gay.”
(Kershaw 2003)
17. This is the same court in which civil rights activist Dr. Saad Eddin
Ibrahim was successfully prosecuted for defaming the Egyptian
government. His conviction was later overturned on appeal.
18. Foreign nationals that have been swept up by the vice squad have,
by and large, not been prosecuted. A notable exception is the
prosecution after entrapment of Wissam Abyad, a Lebanese national.
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(Amnesty International 2003)
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